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Abstract
Digital data storage is essential nowadays. We store all types of data in our devices, either locally
or using cloud storage services. Cloud services have several advantages, such as data sharing
among devices, space saving in local storage, and data preservation in case of devices hardware
failure. However, they also pose some risks, which users often do not realize, such as temporary
or permanent unavailability or loss of confidentiality of the stored files. This work consists on
the development of a secure file storage system based on public cloud services that mitigate the
mentioned risks by combining the use of multiple cloud providers with redundancy mechanisms
and cryptographic techniques. The system ensures that, even if one provider is hostile or goes
out of business, there is no loss of data or confidentiality.
vii

Resumo
O armazenamento de dados em formato digital é actualmente indispensável. Guardamos
diversos tipos de dados nos nossos dispositivos, quer localmente, quer recorrendo a serviços de
armazenamento cloud. Os serviços cloud apresentam várias vantagens, nomeadamente a partilha
de dados entre dispositivos, a poupança de espaço no armazenamento local, e a sobrevivência
dos dados a falhas de hardware dos dispositivos. No entanto, o seu uso apresenta alguns riscos,
dos quais muitas vezes os utilizadores não se apercebem, sendo os mais significativos os de
indisponibilidade temporária ou permanente dos ficheiros e de perda de confidencialidade dos
mesmos. Este trabalho consiste no desenvolvimento de um sistema de armazenamento seguro de
ficheiros em serviços públicos de cloud que mitiga os riscos mencionados combinando o recurso a
vários provedores de cloud com o uso de mecanismos de redundância e de técnicas criptográficas.
O sistema garante que, mesmo se um dos provedores for hostil, não há perda dados nem da sua
confidencialidade.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data storage is essential nowadays. We store everything, from personal data (like photos or
text messages) to critical data (like medical records or financial reports). There are two main
approaches to store data: local storage or cloud storage.
The concept of storing data in the cloud emerged in the last past few years, embedded in the
cloud computing concept. Cloud computing is defined by National Institute of Standards and
Technology of U.S. (NIST) as a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management
effort or service provider interaction [1].
Cloud storage is a particular case of cloud computing where the computing resources are storage
servers. In this context, we can define a Cloud Storage Provider (CSP) as the entity that provides
the service, a Cloud Storage Service (CSS) as the service that enables to store and manage the
remote files, and cloud as the infrastructure where we store the data.
Many CSSs are available for use, either directed at users or companies. For users, there are many
free options with a decent amount of space (at least 15GB), and for companies, as they need a
lot more of space and speed, there are a lot of paid services that usually charge for bandwidth
and storage capacity.
Storing data in the cloud has some advantages: we can overcome the limitation of the local
1
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device storage capacity: the files are readily available from anywhere in any device and the cost is
lower, since maintaining a local data center is expensive. Despite all the advantages, there are
some drawbacks in storing data in the cloud. Local storage is more secure [2] [3], because when
we store data in the cloud, it is stored in a place we do not know and supervised by people we do
not know. Therefore, we can not be sure that they (the CSP) will not lose it, misuse it, or even
leak it.
Some recent accidents show us that we can not trust in the CSPs to keep our data safe. Sometimes
they fail or are hacked, and that can result in a leak, temporary or even permanent loss of stored
data. In the 2016, every major commercial CSPs was offline for some time as we can see in
Figure 1.1. The Google Cloud Platform was offline for more than 11 hours [4] [5]. In 2009 a
company lost 500GB of users data along with the backup and never managed to recover the
data [6]. In 2012 two-thirds (68 million) of Dropbox users passwords were stolen by hackers and
later in 2016 they were made publicly available on the Internet [7]. In 2014 one of the most
mediatic hacks ever occurred: hundreds of private photos of celebrities were leaked from the
Apple Icloud storage service [8].
Another big concern about keeping data in the cloud is the vendor-lock-in issue. There is a
possibility that the CSPs raise the price or simply start charging for bandwidth (in the case of the
free ones), so if we have the data stored at only one provider, we either lose the access to the data
or we are forced to pay a large amount of money to recover it. For more detail on that subject
read reference [9]. To conclude, we do not have guarantees of confidentiality or availability of the
data stored in public clouds.
This work consists of the development of an Android application that, using information partition
and cryptographic techniques, allows users to keep folders in CSSs guaranteeing the confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of its contents. Caching techniques are used to improve application
performance. The objective is to use public cloud services like Dropbox, Google Drive and One
Drive as storing platforms (public CSSs), although in this we work we present a proof of concept
using diverse accounts of the same CSP.
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Figure 1.1: Cloud storage providers downtime in 2015. [4]
1.1 Context and Motivation
In the past years, we have witnessed a big growth of smartphones usage, as shown in Figure 1.2.
We already reached a point where we have more smartphone users than desktop users [10]. We
started to do a little bit of everything in our smartphones, and because of that we need to store a
lot of data in them, data that sometimes is sensitive or merely private, and we want it to stay
confidential. Either because we need to access them in other devices or because our device has
limited storage space, we often store data in the cloud. Because of that, cloud storage is widely
used in smartphones, but not the way we intend to use it, which is both explicit, where the user
knows that folder is a "cloud" folder, but we want the use of that folder to be transparent (i.e.,
similar to anything else), and generic (any files and applications). That means that users are
storing data in those services, most of them without knowing the risks involved.
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Figure 1.2: Mobile users vs Desktop users. [10]
We developed a solution for Android, that is the most used Operative System (OS) for smartphones
with an 87.6% market share [11]. It is free to develop for Android unlike some other platforms,
and it is one of the easiest mobile platforms to develop for.
Our system allows users to substantially reduce the risks of data loss, data leakage, and temporarily
data unavailability. Data privacy is a big concern for most of the mobile device users, and they
have no available solutions to address this problem. With our application, they can overcome the
limitations of simple cloud storage, and securely store their data in the cloud.
1.2 Objectives
Our main goal is to develop a secure cloud based file system, where secure means assured
confidentiality and availability. From that objective, we derive other objectives and requirements
for the application.
We can categorize these requirements by their importance level:
5 FCUP
Objectives
Must Have
Confidentiality The data stored in the public clouds must stay confidential, even in a case
of a partial leak (for example one cloud authentication compromised);
Availability The data stored in the public clouds must stay available, even if one of the
CSPs is not. Using a single CSP the files stay unavailable in average 0.01% of the
time, we aim to lower that unavailable time in our system;
Integrity The application must ensure data integrity. In the event of data manipulation (by
the CSP or another agent) the application must be able first to detect then recover
from that situation without data loss;
POSIX file system The application must be capable of mounting a POSIX [12] compatible
file system that acts as a local folder, but in reality store the data in at least two
public clouds;
Caching The system must maintain a local cache, so it does not need to download every
file every time we need to access them.
Should Have
Good Performance The file system should have a decent performance in computational
context; We must analyze the options that we can use to perform the operations to
add redundancy to the system and to encrypt the files and take in consideration their
performance, in order to minimize the impact of the user experience;
Low Storage Overhead To achieve data availability we use redundancy mechanisms that
always have storage overhead associated, and as we are using cloud services to store the
data (with limited free space), we need to pick a redundancy mechanism with an storage
utilization rate near to optimal. Where the utilization rate = usable storage
total storage
, the
usable storage is the amount of space available to store files (usable storage =
total storage− redundancy storage).
Easy to use Interface The application must have a graphical interface that allows the
users to configure and manage the system, allowing them to mount the File System (FS)
in a local folder.
Could Have
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Recover to fully consistent state In case of a CSP permanent failure, the system must
be capable of automatically recover to a fully consistent state, asking the user for a
new CSP only.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
In Chapter 2 we introduce some important definitions and concepts about cloud storage as they
are a must to better understand the rest of the document. We also analyze the available options
to achieve the main objectives (cloud storage integrity, availability and integrity), comparing the
pros and cons of each option. Finally, we take a look into some implementations that somehow
are related to the work described in this document, highlighting the similarities and differences.
In Chapter 3 we make a top down description of the system architecture, explaining the main
components of the system and the chosen methods to achieve cloud storage integrity, availability
and integrity.
In Chapter 4 we describe the development of the system, showing some code and explaining all
the functions we implemented to achieve cloud storage confidentiality, availability and integrity.
In Chapter 5 we analyze the results of this work, highlighting the system performance and the
impact of the decisions we made in the security and performance of the system.
In Chapter 6 we make a conclusion of the dissertation, discussing some important decisions and
how we met the objectives. We also present the future work that can be made in order to improve
the system.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we describe the mechanisms that can be used to achieve the proposed goals, by
answering "What can be done to achieve confidentiality, availability, and integrity in a cloud of
public clouds file system?". As well in this chapter are introduced some basic terms that will be
used throughout the dissertation. Finally, we describe the current implementations and research
already done on this subject.
2.1 Cloud Computing
As our primary goal is to build a secure cloud storage file system, we need to understand what is
cloud storage, and for that, it is necessary first to understand cloud computing. Cloud storage is
a particular service among all cloud computing possibilities.
We already introduced a formal definition of cloud computing in Chapter 1. In short, we can
define it as an agglomeration of computing resources (usually servers), that can be deployed in a
short period. The users of a cloud computing service can start by buying a small amount of those
resources and, as their business grows, buy more and have access to them almost instantly with
or without minimal service provider intervention. So they have access to an easily scalable service,
usually cheaper than a local infrastructure.
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2.1.1 Essential Characteristics
Cloud computing services must have some essential characteristics as [1]:
On-demand service A consumer can automatically provision computing resources (such as server
time, network storage or virtual memory) without requiring human interaction on server
side;
Broad network access The service is available over the network (internet) to be accessed by
standard client platforms like mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations;
Resource pooling The provider computing resources (such as storage, processing, memory, and
network bandwidth) are pooled to serve multiple consumers, with different physical and
virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. Users
usually have no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources,
but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (country, state, or
datacenter);
Rapid elasticity In order to enable consumers to be able to scale their platform quickly, the
computing resources are elastically provisioned and released, in some cases automatically.
The resources available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited in consumer view and
can be appropriated in any quantity at any time.
2.1.2 Service models
We can classify the cloud services in three different ways [1] [13], depending on what we have
access to:
SaaS The consumer can only use a provider application that runs on the cloud infrastructure.
The application is accessible from an interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based
email), or a program interface. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying
cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual
application capabilities;
9 FCUP
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PaaS The consumer can deploy applications created using programming languages, libraries,
services, and tools supported by the provider to the cloud infrastructure. The consumer
does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers,
operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly
configuration settings for the application-hosting environment;
IaaS The consumer can provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing
resources and can deploy and run arbitrary software in that resources, which can include
operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the
underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed
applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host
firewalls).
Figure 2.1: A comparsion between the discribed cloud service storage models SaaS, PaaS and IaaS [14], where vendor is the
CSP.
In figure 2.1 we have a visual description of the presented models. As shown, each service model
is very different. We can have cloud services that only allow us to use an application, but also
can have services that allow us to control almost every aspect of the system. In our work, we use
CSS’s, and they are in the SaaS category, so this immediately imposes some restrictions to what
we can do. We must be aware that we can not implement new functions as we are restricted to
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the interface of the service provider.
2.1.3 Cloud Storage
Cloud storage is a cloud computing service, where the consumers can allocate an apparently
infinite amount of storage space. The service is accessible from an interface, such as a web
browser or application. Some CSPs also have a Application Programming Interface (API) (usually
a REST API) that allow consumers to manage the contents stored in the cloud. As we can see
in Figure 2.2, the CSP can accept objects with different granularity: they can be blocks or files
depending on the CSP.
The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, and he only can
allocate space and use it to store data, so cloud storage services are labeled as SaaS.
There are a lot of CSSs, some targeting end users while others targeting companies, usually the
ones that target the users give some free space to consumers, then if they need to pay for extra
space.
Our service is based on CSPs that target end-users, as DropBox, Google Drive and One Drive,
which are free to use public clouds.
We can look at cloud as a folder where we can store files and other folders, just as a folder in a
local file system. We have API calls that allow us to get, put, delete and move files stored in the
cloud, as we can do in a local file system.
2.2 Storage Availability
In order to mitigate the problem of availability we can add redundant information to the file
system, so when a CSP fails (temporarily or permanently), we can still access the files. In this
section, we look into some different methods to achieve data redundancy, each one with different
characteristics. The probability that more than one cloud service provider fail at the same time is
low, considering that the average downtime of public CSPs is 0.001% [4], the probability of having
two unavailable at the same time is 0.00001%. Considering that, ensuring that our system can
recover from one failure should be enough, although we analyze some options that can tolerate
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Figure 2.2: A high level architecture of a cloud storage. [15]
more than one failure.
As we use more than one CSP, we can split the files among them, and this adds a confidentiality
factor because if anyone can access our files, they do not have access to the entire content. Some
analyzed methods inclusively add some obfuscation to the file chunks, making it even harder to
get some information of the original content. But the confidentiality factor provided by these
methods is not much important because it is still possible to recover some information of the
original data from individual chunks, for achieving confidentiality we present other options in
section 2.3.
2.2.1 Mirroring
The most straightforward approach to obtain redundancy in a file system is to make copies of the
original content. That method is known by information replication or mirroring. We can make
one or more copies of the files, and put them in the available cloud storage providers and when
FCUP 12
Background
one provider fails we just get the file from any other. This is the technique used by RAID 1 [16]
and it requires at least two disks. We can apply this method to our system considering individual
clouds as disks.
Replication is one of the most common methods to achieve high data availability. For example,
Google File System [17] and Hadoop distributed file system [18] use replication to achieve data
availability. It is easy to implement and has excellent performance. Also, it is a very flexible
solution when it comes to the number of failures that we can tolerate. If we have n (n >= 2)
clouds we can tolerate up to n− 1 failures at same time. But this comes with a huge drawback,
and it has a high storage overhead. For example, with the original data and 3 replicas, the storage
utilization rate is only 11 + 3 = 25%. Another drawback associated with the storage overhead is
the network bandwidth required to send the replicas to the respective clouds, or to migrate all
the data.
2.2.2 Simple Parity
Simple Parity is a straightforward approach to achieve one drive fault tolerance and has been used
for a long time by RAID 4. As shown in Figure 2.3 it is based on simple parity checks, where one
disk is reserved for parity storage. Considering that we have three drives and one is reserved for
parity storage, to store a file, we first split the file into two chunks, calculate the parity between
them (originating a new piece of the same size), doing bit by bit XOR operations [19].
This method requires at least three clouds, if one CSP fails we can rebuild the information that
was stored in it by doing a XOR operation between the remaining two disks.
The storage overhead with this method is optimal, the total amount of usable space is equal to the
sum of the capacity of all clouds minus the storage of the parity reserved cloud. Considering three
clouds with 1 GB each, we have 2GB of usable space in a total of 3GB, the storage utilization
rate is 22 + 1 = 66%. It is an easy to implement method, based in simple operations with a good
performance.
13 FCUP
Storage Availability
Figure 2.3: An example how parity works in RAID 4 scheme with 4 disks where one is reserved for parity storage. [20]
2.2.3 Erasure Coding
Erasure coding is a coding technique for encoding a file adding redundant information to it. It
allows us to split a file into k chunks and encoded it into n > k chunks, where, considering |F |
the size of the file, each chunk has a size of n
k
× |F |, that is an optimal storage overhead if we are
recovering the file from k chunks. Then from any k chunks out of the n chunks, we can rebuild
the original file as we can see in Figure 2.4. We denote m = n− k as the number of redundant or
parity chunks and assume that each chunk is stored on a distinct cloud. In most implementations
of this method we can chose any combination of (n, k), where n > k > 1.
As there is an encoding process, the originated chunks are not plain text, making it harder to get
information about the original data.
Considering that we have three clouds with 1GB each, we have 2GB of usable space in a total of
3GB, the storage utilization rate using this scheme (n = 3, k = 2) is 22 + 1 = 66%.
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Figure 2.4: Example of a system with an erasure code where k=4 and n=6, resulting in a system that is resilient to m=2
failures. [21]
This is the generic idea of erasure coding, and there are many implementations out there, the
algorithms that implement this technique are known as IDAs [22]. The difference between the
implementations is essentially the encoding algorithm, which can result in different performances.
Those algorithms typically are computationally intensive, many of them are formulated as the
matrix-product forms, which means that the encoding and decoding complexities depend on
the matrix products computing overhead. The conventional approaches of (n, k) IDA, such
as [23], requires O(n × k) operations for encoding and O(k2) operations for decoding. But
there are some recent implementations with much better performance, for example, there is an
implementation based in Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) over finite fields, with a computational
complexity of O(n logn) for encoding and O(k(n− k + log k)) for decoding [24]. Another one is
based in Reed-Solomon erasure coding [25], a very popular erasure coding technique, it has a
computational complexity of O(n logn) for encoding and decoding [26].
Although the storage overhead is optimal, and there are some implementations with proper
encoding and decoding performance, they are complicated to implement.
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2.3 Storage Confidentiality
The access to files in a cloud is already protected by a security mechanism (Username and
Password), and some CSPs claim that they encrypt the files, but we do not know who has access
to the cryptographic keys. Also, the authentication mechanism is not enough to ensure the
confidentiality of the files, and there are many examples where this mechanism failed, already
described in section 1.1.
Throughout this dissertation, we will consider that the attacker has not access to the user device,
we aim to protect the user from inside attacks (from the CSPs) and from attacks to the CSPs.
With that in mind we use the user device to store some critical information as CSP account
authentication tokens and cryptographic keys.
We also have seen in section 2.2 that the mechanisms of redundancy can add some security, but
we want a robust system, where in a case of a leak, of the entire content of a single cloud, it
does not result in a leak of any information about the original files. So we assume the worst
case scenario, where the cloud storage provider can be malicious (inside attack) and/or the
authentication details can be leaked or compromised.
In order to protect the files stored in the cloud from inside security breaches and external attackers
we need to use cryptography techniques, but we need to take some important aspects in mind
when choosing a cryptographic method:
Performance The chosen cipher must be fast, every time we want to put, modify or retrieve a
file from a cloud storage service. We will need to perform cryptographic operations, and
there will always be a delay associated with those operations, so we need to choose one
cipher with a short time overhead. There is as well a computational overhead associated
with those operations and considering that the system will run on mobile devices, we need
to take this aspect into account, the computational power is much more limited than in
other devices, and they run on a battery;
Storage Overhead The chosen cipher must add a minimal space overhead, although the cloud
storage providers that we use are free they have limited space, so we need to take this
aspect in mind.
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Modern cryptography relies on a secret called key, that is the security factor needed to encrypt
and decrypt the files. But there are two different approaches, the symmetric ciphers, that use
only one key that must be known by the sender and the receiver, and public key cryptography
that use a pair of keys (one private and one public).
2.3.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric ciphers require only one key, and that key must be known by the sender and the
receiver, as the encryption and decryption process relies on that key, if the key is revealed, the
data can be revealed too.
There are two types of symmetric ciphers that are classified by the granularity of the encrypt and
decrypt process:
Stream ciphers The bytes are individually encrypted without feedback to other chunks of data
(in most ciphers/modes). Also, stream ciphers do not provide integrity protection or
authentication, whereas some block ciphers can provide integrity protection, in addition to
confidentiality. This method is used to encrypt stream of data with no predefined size;
Block ciphers The encryption unit is a block with a pre-defined size, most of the implementations
have a feedback system where the result of a block influences the next one, they are more
susceptible to noise in transmission, that is if you mess up one part of the data, all the rest
is probably unrecoverable.
Block ciphers typically require more memory, since they work on larger chunks of data and often
have "carry over" from previous blocks, whereas since stream ciphers work on only a few bits at
a time, they have relatively low memory requirements (and therefore cheaper to implement in
limited scenarios such as embedded devices).
Because of all the above, stream ciphers are usually best for cases where the amount of data is either
unknown or continuous - such as network streams. Block ciphers, on the other hand, are more
useful when the amount of data is known before the transmission, as a file, or request/response
protocols, such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) message where the length of the total
message is known.
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2.3.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography requires a pair of keys, where one is to be kept private and one to be
publicly known. This kind of ciphers allows us to have different keys in the encryption decryption
process.
To send a file to someone, we use their public key to encrypt it then only the person that has the
private key that corresponds to that public key can decrypt the file.
Those ciphers are great because we can exchange a secret without a previously known key. We
just need a protocol to distribute the public keys among the users. However, it is not suitable for
large amounts of data because of its poor performance when compared to symmetric ciphers [27].
2.4 Storage Confidentiality and Availability Combined Solutions
In this section, we look into a solution that provides at same time confidentiality and redundancy
known by secret sharing scheme. We describe as well how we can combine the previously discussed
techniques in sections 2.2 and 2.3 to achieve storage confidentiality and availability. We will
discard combinations that use public key cryptography because we already concluded that they
are not adequate to a system like ours.
Finally, we make a resumed comparison between the possible solutions, analyzing the most
important factors.
In some presented solutions we need to store, in the local storage, a key for a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm. But this does not add much of a security risk because the system already
need to store CSPs authentication information.
2.4.1 Secret Sharing
This scheme has very similar functional characteristics with erasure coding presented in Section 2.2.
It also allows us to split a file into k chunks and encoded it into n chunks, then from any k
chunks out of the n chunks we can rebuild the original file, but for secret sharing k must be
n = 2k − 1 [28] instead of just n > k > 1.
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The major difference between secret sharing and erasure coding is that with secret sharing having
access to k − 1 chunks of the file does not provide any information about the original file. So
that allows us to use this method to achieve confidentiality and availability at the same time.
Although this approach has one big drawback when compared to erasure codes, the storage
overhead, with secret sharing each chunk has the same size of the original file. Which regarding
storage overhead is equal to the information replication approach that is bad.
2.4.2 Secret Sharing with Symmetric Cipher and Information Dispersal Al-
gorithm
To solve the storage overhead problem of secret sharing, it was proposed a scheme [29] that
combines traditional secret sharing schemes like [28] encryption and Information Dispersal
Algorithms (IDA).
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Figure 2.5: Process of storing a file in the cloud of clouds using secret sharing, IDA and a symmetric cipher, where n = 3,
k = 2 and m = 1. ENCkey represents the encryption of the File using key.
With this combination we have a scheme with a minimal storage overhead, assuming |F | as the
size of a file F , each chunk has a size of |F |
m
where m is the number of chunks needed to recover
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the file, plus a short piece of information that depended on the security factor (the size of the key
of the cipher).
The process is simple and is illustrated in Figure 2.5. To assure confidentiality we generate a
random key for the symmetric cipher algorithm, and encrypt the file using that key, then we use a
IDA to encode the file that has a much lower storage overhead than a secret sharing scheme, and
use the secret sharing scheme (with same k, n and m parameters) to encode only the key (that
is much smaller when compared to the file). As a result, we have n chunks of the key encrypted
with a secret sharing scheme and n chunks of the file encoded with a IDA. Now we can send
them in pairs (keyi, filei) to the clouds, then to recover a file we just need k of those chunks to
retrieve the key, recover the file, and then decrypt the file as shown in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Process of recovering a file from the cloud of clouds using secret sharing, IDA and a symmetric cipher, where
n = 3, k = 2 and m = 1. ENCkey represents the decryption of E using key.
With this scheme, in an eventual failure of one to m CSP we still have access to the files, only
need to get other redundant chunks from other clouds. If k − 1 pairs (keyi, filei) are leaked
there is not any given information at all about the original files [29].
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2.4.3 Information Replication with Symmetric Cipher
This is the simplest scheme presented, the process to store a file is described in Figure 2.7, we
use a symmetric cipher to encrypt the file with a key stored locally in the android device, then we
just send one copy of the encrypted file to each cloud.
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Figure 2.7: Process of storing a file in the cloud of clouds using information replication and a symmetric cipher, with 2 copies
of the original data. ENCkey represents the encryption of E using key
To recover the file we just get a copy from any cloud as shown in Figure 2.8, if one fails we just
get it from any other.
This solution tolerates up to n− 1 cloud failures, where n is the total number of clouds. And the
storage overhead is the same as the information replication without encrypting the file which is
bad.
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Figure 2.8: Process of recovering a file from the cloud of clouds using information replication and a symmetric cipher, with
2 copies of the original data. ENCkey represents the decryption of E using key.
2.4.4 Simple Parity with Symmetric Cipher
With this solution, we first encrypt the file (using a symmetric cipher) with a locally stored key,
then split it into n − 1 chunks, where n is the total number of available clouds, and calculate
the parity of those chunks (with XOR operations) to get a redundant chunk. This process is
described in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: Process of storing a file in the cloud of clouds using simple parity and a symmetric cipher, with a total of three
clouds. ENCkey represents the encryption of E using key, and cloud 3 stores the parity.
That redundant chunk allows us to recover from a single CSP failure, in that eventuality we need
to calculate the parity between all the other chunks (including the parity one).
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Figure 2.10: Process of recovering a file from the cloud of clouds simple parity and a symmetric cipher, with a total of three
clouds. ENCkey represents the decryption of E using key, and cloud 3 stores the parity.
As we can see in Figure 2.10, we always need n− 1 chunks to recover the file and do not need
to do any calculations to recover it when all clouds are available (only need to join the chunks
and then decipher). This allows us to have an excellent performance, but we are limited to a one
failure resistance.
In the eventual failure of one CSP we must get the redundant chunk and recalculate the missing
one as described in Figure 2.11;
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Figure 2.11: Process of recovering a file from the cloud of clouds considering the failure of one cloud, using simple parity
and a symmetric cipher, with a total of three clouds. ENCkey represents the decryption of E using key, cloud 3 stores the
parity chunks.
2.4.5 IDA with Symmetric Cipher
This method is somehow similar to the one presented in subsection 2.4.2, but instead of using a
secret sharing scheme to ensure confidentiality distributing the key among the clouds, it stores
the key of the symmetric cipher locally in the android device storage.
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Figure 2.12: Process of storing a file in the cloud of clouds using IDA and a symmetric cipher, where n = 3, k = 2 and
m = 1. ENCkey represents the encryption of the File using key.
We need first to define a key, then to store a file we encrypt it with that key, then encode it with
a IDA. As a result, we have n chunks, where n must be equal to the number of clouds. Finally,
we send each chunk to each cloud, the whole process is described in Figure 2.12. To recover the
file, we get any k chunks from any k clouds, decode the chunks with the IDA, then decrypt the
file as described in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Process of recovering a file in the cloud of clouds using IDA and a symmetric cipher, where n = 3, k = 2 and
m = 1. ENCkey represents the encryption of File using key.
As in the method described in Subsection 2.4.2, in an eventual failure of one up to m CSP we still
have access to the files, and we only need to get other redundant chunks from the other clouds.
2.4.6 Solutions Comparison
In this subsection we objectively compare the differences between the presented solutions,
considering important parameters that can help us understand their adequacy to meet our
objectives.
For storage efficiency calculations we will assume n = 3 number of available clouds, k the number
of chunks needed to recover the data, m = n− k the number of redundant chunks.
In Table 2.1 we have a comparison between the presented solutions, the Implementation complexity
column is and subjective indicative of the difficulty level expected to efficiently implement the
designated method in code.
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For the threshold schemes (IDA and secret sharing) k = 2 and m = 1. But, to a fair comparison,
for the information replication method we assume n = 2 and k = 1. The storage efficiency
corresponds to the percentage of usable space, tolerating only one CSP failure.
Storage
efficiency
Computational
complexity
Implementation
complexity
m failures
tolerance
Minimum
n clouds
Secret Sharing 33% (n log2 n) [28] high m = n− k 3
IDA 66% O(n logn) [26] high m = n− k 2
Secret Sharing+IDA 66% 1 (n log2 n) [28] very high m = n− k 3
Replication 50% N/A very low m = n− 1 2
Simple Parity 66% O(n) low m = 1 3
Table 2.1: A comparison between the solutions presented in this section. All the methods apart from Secret Sharing are
combined with a symmetric cipher. Schemes that use secret sharing must respect n = 2k − 1
Analyzing Table 2.1 we can conclude that there are only three methods(IDA, Secret sharing
plus IDA and Simple Parity) that we can use to met our objectives of low storage overhead and
decent performance discussed in Section 1.2. Being the easiest one to implement the simple parity
method.
The solutions that use secret sharing do not require the storage of a cryptography key locally in
the device. All the others have that requirement as they are combined with a symmetric cipher
that uses a key stored in the application configuration file.
2.5 Storage Integrity
A storage system that provides availability and confidentiality can not be reliable if it has no
integrity mechanisms. If we can not verify that the data we are accessing is the same we had
stored before, we can have a serious security problem. Imagine that some attacker manages to
inject some malicious code into a stored file, if we do not have a mechanism to detect that the
data has been altered, in the best case the file will only be corrupted, in the worst case we will
infect the user device with the injected malware.
As it is impossible to prevent all causes of integrity violation, we aim to have a data storage
1A little bit less than 66% because of the additional information of the encoded symmetric key 2.4.2
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system that can detect and tolerate them.
In cryptography context, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a piece of information used to
authenticate a message, and sometimes it is incorrectly called a cryptographic hash function since
a cryptographic hash function is only one of the possible ways to generate a MAC. They accept
as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message, and gives as output a MAC value that
protects both the message data integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing someone that also
has the secret key to detect any changes to the message content [30].
As said before one way to generate a MAC is by using cryptographic hash functions. Hash
functions are sometimes called compressing functions, that is because they generate from an
arbitrary size data a fixed sized data (resuming the original data). They accept as input an
arbitrary-length message and return a value called hash value, hash code, digest, or simply hash.
A hash function must have three essential characteristics:
Pre-image resistance Given a hash value h, it should be computationally hard to find any
message m such that h = hfunc(k,m), where k is the hash key;
Second pre-image resistance Given a message m1, it should be computational hard to find a
different message m2 such that hfunc(k,m1) = hfunc(k,m2), where k is the hash key;
Collision resistance Given two messages m1 and m2, it should be computational hard to find a
hash such that hfunc(k,m1) = hfunc(k,m2), where k is the hash key.
A hash function that respects those rules can be used for integrity checks because they represent
a unique resume of the original data using that function. We can calculate the hash value of a
message, send it along the message, and the receiver then using the same hash function generates
the hash value of received content and if it matches the message has not been modified.
Most CSP provide hash values of the stored data in metadata fields. However, this is not enough
to enforce the integrity of our system. An attacker can modify the file, generate a new hash value
and change the meta-data. That leads us to the initially exposed MAC, which requires a secret
key along with the data as input. In that way, the attacker would need the secret key to generate
a hash with the same value.
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2.6 Related Work
Our solution is unique for the Android platform, some applications combine multiple CSP accounts
into one, basically merging the available space into one file system but those do not add any security
features or redundancy features. There are some that allow users to protect data confidentiality
by encrypting the files before storing them remotely, but again they do not provide availability
mechanisms. Also, our system allows users to mount the FS in a local folder, integrating it into
the system.
Bellow we describe some solutions that somehow are related to our solution:
TOPDOX Ficheiros & Cloud Docs [31] TOPDOX is an Android application that helps its
users to manage documents stored in the cloud. They have a feature that allows users to
merge several CSP into one FS, but the similarities with our solution end there, they do
not provide availability, integrity or confidentiality mechanisms.
EasySSHFS [32] EasySSHFS is a solution that, like ours, allows users to mount a remote FS
into a local storage folder, but it is not a cloud storage solution and does not add any
security or redundancy mechanisms. The Android application allows mounting a remote FS
using SFTP that most SSH servers support and enable this SFTP access by default.
SafeCloud Photos [33] Safe cloud is a solution very similar to ours, but it only works for photos.
It is an android application that allows the users to configure public CSP accounts and then
the photos are split and stored across them using cryptographic techniques to ensure that if
an account is compromised, there is no leaked information about the stored photos. This
solution is focused on privacy, and does not provide any redundancy mechanisms, that is
another thing that differentiates this solution. Our solution can be considered an extension
of this solution, allowing any file extension and adding availability and integrity mechanisms.
Although there is no implementation of a cloud file system with improved confidentiality, integrity,
and availability for Android devices, there are some implementations for the Linux OS that meet
those requirements:
DepSky [34] DepSky is a system that improves confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
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data stored in the cloud, it uses encryption, encoding, and replication of data over several
commercial clouds.
The goal is similar to ours, but they use different encoding and cryptographic techniques,
they operate at a lower level and we at the file level, their system behaves like a virtual disk
where we can store blocks. They also use commercial clouds instead of free ones and aim
to store critical data such as medical records and financial summaries.
We can see the architecture of DepSky in figure 2.14, where the clouds are accessed using
their standard API and DepSsky algorithms are implemented as a software library in the
clients.
Figure 2.14: DepSky architecture with 4 clouds and 2 clients [34].
They have two protocols, the DepSky-A to improve availability, that replicates all the data
in clear text in each cloud. And DepSky-CA to improve availability and confidentiality, that
uses secret sharing and erasure code techniques to reproduce the data in a cloud-of-clouds.
In DepSky-CA with four clouds, first is generated an encryption key, and after that the
original data block is encrypted. Then the encoded data block is erasure coded and is
computed key shares of the encryption key. In this case, we get four erasure coded blocks
and four key shares because we use four clouds. Lastly, is stored in each cloud a different
coded block together with a different key share, this is one of the discussed techniques in
section 2.4.
C2FS [35] C2FS is a system that uses DepSky as data storage service, but implements a POSIX
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compatible file system. It improves the data and metadata availability, integrity and
confidentiality. The architecture of the system is the same as DepSky, and it stores the
data in a cloud of clouds. C2FS offers a distributed directory service using a coordination
service, named DepSpace, to store the system meta-data.
The major advantages over DepSky are the ease of use (high level of abstraction, it behaves
like a regular local folder) and distributed directory services that ensure the meta-data
availability and confidentiality.

Chapter 3
System Architecture
In this chapter, we discuss the general architecture components from a high-level perspective.
Our system is meant to run in Android smartphones and allows the users to have access to files
stored in the cloud through a local folder. When the user saves a file in that folder, the file is
not stored locally in the device but sent to the cloud, and when the user requests a file, it is
downloaded from the cloud and presented to the user. However, instead of just storing the files in
a CSP, we perform some modifications in order to keep them safer while in the remote space.
And for safer we mean that even if one provider is hostile, goes out of business or an attacker
manages to access or corrupt our files, there is no loss of data or confidentiality.
In figure 3.1 we can see the system architecture and how its components interact. We have
a FS implementation that intercepts the Android FS calls and replaces them, and some modules
that help us to achieve file availability, confidentiality, and integrity. The Integrity module is
used to verify that an unauthorized entity has not modified a file that we previously stored.
The Redundancy module is responsible for giving the FS the ability to resist to CSPs downtime,
by adding redundant information to the files and storing them split across various CSPs. The
Confidentiality module is used to encrypt the files, so they remain confidential even if they are
leaked. There are also two other modules, the Cloud Abstraction module, that is responsible for
making the communication between our system and the remote space (CSPs), and the Cache
module that is used to improve the system performance maintaining local copies of some files.
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Figure 3.1: Presented solution System Architecture, with a configuration of three CSPs
3.1 Cloud Abstraction Module
This module is necessary because each CSP has its own API to manage the remote space, so we
define an intermediate API that allows us to abstract from the individual CSP APIs and performs
actions uniformly across the different CSPs.
We have a generic interface with the necessary functions (store a file, get a file, list the files in a
folder, among others) to interact with a CSP and independent implementations to interact with
different CSPs. Then when calling a function, it automatically calls the correct implementations
depending on the CSP we are interacting with.
3.2 Availability Module
In order to improve the availability of the stored files, we take advantage of redundancy techniques.
This module provides a series of functions that allow us to add redundant information to the
system and recover lost data.
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As every redundancy technique implies a performance overhead and a higher usage of storage
space we need to choose a method that can balance those two aspects. Our system uses coding
techniques because as seen in detail in section 2.2 the alternative (information replication) would
have a much higher storage space overhead. Among the coding techniques, our system uses simple
parity, and that is because it is easy to implement, has a low impact on the system performance
as it is based on simple operations. The downside of this technique is that it only provides fault
tolerance of one CSP at a time, but as the probability of more than one become inaccessible (or
the files become corrupted) at the same time is low (0.00001% as seen before in Section 2.2), it
is a good choice.
In order to add redundant information to the system, before storing the files in the remote space,
we split them in N − 1 chunks, where N is the number of CSPs in use, and then generate an
extra chunk that stores the redundant data (calculating the bit by bit parity between the other
chunks). As a result, we have N chunks, one for each CSP as we can see in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Calculating redundant information of a file using simple parity, with a configuration of three CSPs
When all CSPs are accessible we can recover the file by getting the first N − 1 chunks, but to
recover a lost file chunk (due the CSP being inaccessible or the data being corrupted) we need to
get the chunkN (the one with the redundant data) and recover the missing chunk by calculating
the bit by bit parity between the available chunks.
Summing up, we use this module to calculate the parity between N input chunks, generating a
new chunk of the same size. This can be used to generate a redundant chunk or to recover a
missing one.
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3.3 Confidentiality Module
Files remotely stored in CSPs are protected by a security mechanism (Authentication by Username
and Password), and some CSPs claim that the files are encrypted, but we do not know who has
access to the cryptographic keys, so we assume the worst case scenario where the CSPs can be
malicious. Also, the authentication mechanism is not enough to ensure the confidentiality of the
stored files, and there are many examples where this mechanism was violated, as we presented
before in Chapter 1. Some Redundancy techniques also provide a low level of confidentiality, as
shown in Section 2.2, but we want a robust system able to maintain the confidentiality of all the
stored content even if the entire content of a single cloud is leaked.
As we can not trust in the CSPs to keep our files confidential, we use cryptographic techniques to
achieve that.
We opted for symmetric cryptography that requires only one key. That key must be known by
the sender and the receiver, as the encryption and decryption process relies on that key, if the key
is revealed, the data can be revealed too. Symmetric Cryptography is much faster and energy
efficient when compared to Public Key Cryptography. This subject is discussed in more detail in
Section 2.2.
Within symmetric cryptography there are some alternatives that can be used [36]. We opted for
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher because it is widely accepted is the most utilized in
the industry but most important because it is considered secure. Also some smartphones chipsets
support AES hardware acceleration. We strongly recommend the use of that cipher, but there are
no impediments to the utilization of another symmetric cipher, as long it is considered secure and
resistant to cryptanalysis.
The AES cipher has many operation modes, but we recommend Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
mode where we need a key and an Initialization Vector (IV). With CBC the previous ciphertext
block (or IV) is effectively random (and independent of the plaintext block), being the block
cipher an effectively random string.
AES comes with three standard key sizes (128, 192 and 256 bits). The 256-bit version is a bit
slower than the 128-bit version (by about 40%) but as NIST recommends the 256-bit version over
128-bit version we follow that recommendation. The key is the same for all files and is generated
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from a user-provided password in the initial configuration of the system.
The IV is used to add randomness at the start of the encryption process. When using CBC mode
(where one block incorporates the prior block), we need a value for the first block, which is where
the IV comes in.
If we had no IV (or use the same) using CBC with just a key, two files that begin with identical
text would produce identical first blocks. If the input files changed midway through, then the two
encrypted files would start to look different beginning at that point and through to the end of the
encrypted file. If someone noticed the similarity at the beginning, could use that information to
determinate the key or the beginning of some files throughout cryptanalysis. Because of that, we
cannot use the same IV for different files, and this is very important to keep the process secure.
Confidentiality is obtained by encrypting the files before storing them in the CSPs. The key used
for encryption is the same for all files and is generated from a user-provided password, the IV is
randomly generated for each file, and changed every time it is updated. The IV is then stored in
the header of the files as it is needed for decryption.
3.4 Integrity Module
For achieving data integrity, we use a MAC that is a piece of information used to authenticate
a message. A MAC accept as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message, and gives as
output a MAC value that protects both the message data integrity as well as its authenticity, by
allowing someone that also has the secret key to detect any changes to the message content [30].
In Figure 3.3 we can see how this method can be used in our system to protect the file integrity,
giving us the ability to detect violations. The process is simple: we just calculate an HMAC value
for each chunk of the file (one for each CSP) and store it in the file header before sending it to
the CSPs. After retrieving a file we calculate the HMAC value again and check if it matches the
one in the header. This operations have an delay associated that is the time to do the calculations
and comparisons, but the recent hash functions have a great performance even when dealing with
great amounts of data.
The generation of HMAC values can be made using different hash functions. We recommend
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Figure 3.3: HMAC calculation at the moment of dispatch and verification at the moment of recipt
the usage of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 2 because it is widely used and it is defined as a
standard by NIST which means that the algorithm validity has been thoroughly tested. There are
many attack attempts against the algorithm but none completely compromises its security [37].
NIST already defined a new standard to replace SHA 2 version but for now there are no available
implementations and SHA 2 is still considered secure to use.
The key used in the HMAC value generation is the same for all files and is generated from a
user-provided password in the initial configuration of the system.
3.5 Caching Module
We use a caching system to keep some files in the local storage because our files are stored
remotely across several CSPs, and we have a delay to download them. This module is not
mandatory, but it can improve a lot the performance of the system.
Usually to implement a cache mechanism we have access to both client and server. We can
maintain a cache in the server, the client, or both, but as our system uses services that are SaaS,
we can not run any code on the server. So we are restricted to client caching, and the caching
structure is limited to file level (we could have block level or file level), as is the data unit provided
for the services we use.
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There two main things that we must be aware when developing a cache mechanism, the cache
replacement policy, that defines how the cached content is replaced when the cache is full, and
the writing policy that defines when the cached content is written to the backing storage (the
clouds in our system).
Examples of writing policies:
Write-back When a file is modified it is written only to the cache. Then it is only written to the
backing storage (the clouds) when a cached file is about to be modified or replaced. We
can define other policies to trigger the write to backing storage;
Write-through The modifications to files are done synchronously to local storage (cache) and
the clouds;
Write-back with on close policy When a file is modified, instead of sending the modifications
synchronously, we just store it in the local cache and write it to the clouds only when the
file is closed.
The one that is most adequate for our system is Write-back with on close policy because it
reduces the number of writes. This has a huge performance impact, since in this case writes
involve network operations.
One important thing about our cache system is that the files are stored in clear text, they are not
encrypted in the cache in order to speed up the retrieval of cached files. After getting a file from
the clouds, we decrypt it first and only afterwards store it in the cache.
When it comes to cache replacement policies, we use a Least Recent Used (LRU) cache policy,
which, as the name implies, consists of removing the least recently used items first. This cache
policy is known for working well in workstations file systems [38]. The reason for its success is
that it assumes that blocks which have been used in the recent past will likely be referenced again
in the near future, a property known as temporal locality. There are other options that could be
used but as LRU is easy to implement and is known to work well in most cases we use it in our
system.
When using a caching system, we must be aware of possible inconsistent states of the file system,
and this can be a huge problem if we consider a scenario where we have multiple parties accessing
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and modifying the file system contents. Although our system is designed to operate in a scenario
where only one device changes and accesses the data, there are still some possible inconsistent
states that we need to take into account:
• Write failure (to the clouds)
• Critical application failure
To reduce the probability of an inconsistent state we can use a simple version manager when
updating a file in the file system, only deleting the old version stored in the clouds when we get a
confirmation of all chunks submissions to the clouds.
3.6 General Overview
This section shows how all the modules collaborate to achieve the proposed objectives making
the remote file storage more secure.
In Figure 3.4, we present the contribution of each module in the process of storing a new file in
our FS. The user pastes a new file in our FS folder. Then, we create a file in the local cache
and perform the writes locally, then when a flush is called, we tell our Cache module to store
the file (removing other files if necessary), and call the Confidentiality module to encrypt the
file using a key generated using a previously provided user password and a randomly generated
IV. The next step is to split the file in N-1 chunks (eg. N=3) and calculate an extra chunk by
invoking the Redundancy module. Then for each chunk, we use the Integrity module to calculate
a HMAC, and store in the header together with the previously generated IV, finally we call Cloud
Abstraction Module to store the files across the N CSPs.
When accessing a file, first we check if we have in the cache. If not, we proceed to download N-1
chunks and check their integrity, by comparing the HMAC value of the download chunks with the
HMAC stored in the header. Then we join the chunks (removing the headers first), obtaining,
as a result, the encrypted file, now we just use the IV previously stored in the header and the
key to decrypt the file. Finally, we store the file in the local cache, so the subsequent accesses
to the same file do not require networking operations. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.5,
and represents the best case scenario where the file integrity was not violated, and all CSPs
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Figure 3.4: Storing a file, with a configuration of N=3 clouds, where the redundant chunk is stored in cloud number 3
are available. To best understand what happens in a situation where a failure occurs look into
Figure 3.6, that represents the FS work-flow when one of first N-1 CSPs are unavailable.
If after getting a chunk from a CSP we detect that its integrity has been violated we just download
a chunk from other CSP, and proceed as if the CSP was off-line, as we can see in Figure 3.6.
Afterwards we delete the invalid chunk, calculate it again using the other chunks and send it to
the corresponding CSP.
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Figure 3.5: Getting a file, with a configuration of N=3 clouds, where the redundant chunk is stored in cloud number 3. All
clouds available.
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Figure 3.6: Getting a file, with a configuration of N=3 clouds, where the redundant chunk is stored in cloud number 3, cloud
2 offline.

Chapter 4
System Implementation
In this chapter we describe how the system implementation is structured, detailing how each part
of the system is built. The base of all the system is the Linux kernel module File System In User
Space (FUSE) that is present in the Android OS and provides an interface for userspace programs
to export a FS to the Linux kernel. Besides the FUSE implementation, this work consists in a
development of an Android application that allows the user to manage the settings of the system.
4.1 Implementation Structure
There are two distinct components in our system, the FS implementation and the Android
application. The FS implementation is the main component of this work as is there that we
implement all the security features. The Android application is used to generate the settings to be
imported to the FS implementation and to manage it, allowing the user to mount and unmount
the FS.
To do the FS implementation, we use the library libfuse that provides a reference implementation
for communicating with the FUSE kernel module. The result is a standalone application that
links with libfuse that provides functions to mount the file system, unmount it, read requests
from the kernel, and send responses back. This means that with libfuse the kernel redirects the
requests to our application allowing us to implement the integrity, redundancy and confidentiality
methods previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
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The Android application is necessary to simplify the usage of the system. Without it the system
can run, but we need to use a command line to execute it, and manually generate the access
tokens to the CSPs. It provides a clean interface that simplifies those steps.
4.1.1 Limitations
The main limitation of the implementation is that it only works on Android devices with root
access 1. We need root access to use FUSE that is an initial requirement of the proposed work. In
the regular Linux kernel we have access to fuse from the applications, but in Android, as the kernel
has some modifications this access is revoked, so in order to have access to it we had two options:
build a custom ROM (custom version of the Android OS) with modified Security-Enhanced
Linux (SELinux) permissions or request root access. We have opted for the second option because
build a custom ROM is too much time consuming and a bigger requirement than just asking for
root access.
We also needed to design the implementation having in mind that it needs to be done using the
programming language C that is the only viable option to implement fuse in Android. Due to
the low-level implementation of the system, each module was validated using unit tests and a
memory leak check tool (valgrind) in order to prevent implementation errors.
4.2 FUSE
Normally in order to create a custom FS, we would need to write a kernel module as it manages the
file manipulation requests, but that would be hard to achieve and would require the development
of a custom ROM. In order to overcome the complexity of that, we have FUSE that allows the
development outside of the kernel level (at the user level).
The FUSE project has two components: the fuse kernel module and the libfuse userspace library
that provides the reference implementation for communicating with the FUSE kernel module. As
we do not actually work with the kernel module, we will not go into detail about how it works.
For more information about it consult the documentation [39].
1Android uses the Linux kernel, rooting an Android device gives the user similar access to administrative
(superuser) permissions just as on Linux.
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Figure 4.1 shows an example where the file system is mounted at /tmp/fuse and the user
program is ./hello. When a request is made at the mount point (ls− l/tmp/fuse) the request
is passed to the Virtual File System, then passed to the FUSE kernel module and finally to libfuse
that calls an appropriate function (in this case hello_readdir(), called every time that the OS
wants to read the contents of a dir), then a response is generated and goes throughout the same
path back.
Figure 4.1: A diagram that shows how FUSE works, the arrows show the OS components that the requests and responses
must go troughouth [40].
In the libfuse component when the user mode program (our implementation) calls fusermount()
it parses the arguments passed to the program, then calls fuse_mount() that creates a
UNIX domain socket pair, then forks and execs fusermount() passing it one end of the
socket in the FUSE_COMMFD_ENV environment variable. fusermount() loads the
fuse module then open /dev/fuse and send the file handle over a UNIX domain socket back to
fuse_mount(). fuse_mount() returns the filehandle for /dev/fuse to fusermount(). The
function fusermount() calls fuse_new() which allocates a struct fusedatastructure that stores
and maintains a cached image of the FS data. Lastly, fusermount() calls either fuse_loop()
FCUP 48
System Implementation
or fuse_loop_mt() which both start to read the FS system calls from /dev/fuse, calling the
usermode functions that we have implemented. The results of those calls are then written back
to the /dev/fuse file where they can be forwarded back to the system calls.
In order to have a functional FS, we do not need to implement all FUSE functions. Due to the
lack of time we decided to implement only the essential ones, which we can see in listing 4.1. All
functions return an integer 0 or a positive number for success, or a negative value selected from
errno.h if there is an error.
  
static struct fuse_operations mcfs_oper = {
.getattr = mcfs_getattr,
.readdir = mcfs_readdir,
.unlink = mcfs_unlink,
.open = mcfs_open,
.read = mcfs_read,
.flush = mcfs_flush,
.write = mcfs_write,
.create = mcfs_create,
.release = mcfs_release
}; 
Listing 4.1: fuse_operations struct containing only the functions that we have implemented
The functions implementation should have a prefix related to the FS name. For example, in an
SSH FS we should use ssh_getattr, ssh_read and so on. In our case, we use the prefix mcfs
(Multi-Cloud File System).
Most of the FUSE functions have two ways to identify the file being operated. The first, which is
always available, is the "path" argument, which is the full pathname (relative to the FS root)
of the file in question. The second is a "file handle" in the fuse_file_info structure. The file
handle is stored in the fh element of that structure. If we want to use it, we need to set it in the
open, create, and opendir functions so other functions can then use it.
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4.2.1 Main function
This is the function used to initialize the file system by calling the fuse_main() function and
passing it the implemented fuse operations, but we can use it to generate a shared "object"
(fuse_file_info structure) to be accessed in any operation that we use to store information
about cache and other useful things. First, we need to parse the program parameters in our
main() function. Four parameters are required: the mount point path, the cache size, the
password for confidentiality and the password for integrity.
After parsing the arguments we use them to fill a struct called fs_state that as we can see in
Listing 4.2 has the following parameters:
FILE ∗ logfile A File pointer to a logfile where we print errors and warnings;
char ∗ rootdir A string containing the parent directory of the mount point;
unsignedchar ∗ conf_key The cryptographic key used in to encrypt the files;
unsignedchar ∗ int_key The cryptographic key used in to generate HMACs;
structcache_info ∗ cache A struct that maintains the cache state;
structhashmap ∗ journal A struct that maintains the journal state;
pthread_mutex_tmetadata_cache_mutex pthreads mutex used to protect the cache struct
from concurrent modifications ;
pthread_mutex_tjournal_mute pthreads mutex used to protect the journal struct from
concurrent modifications;
pthread_cond_tjournal_condition pthreads condition used to signal and wakeup the worker
thread.
This struct is important as it represents the FS state. We can access at any time in the FS
operations by calling fuse_get_context()− > private_data.
Besides the program arguments described we also need a config file that must be in the same
directory as the program with the name config.json. This config file is generated by our Android
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application as described in section 4.11. This file has the access tokens that allow the system to
communicate with the CSPs.
  
struct fs_state {
FILE *logfile; // F i l e p o i n t e r to e r r o r l og f i l e
char *rootdir; //mount po in t parent d i r
PNODE provider_list; //A l i s t o f p r o v i d e r s , each PNODE has i n f o rma t i on
about a p r o v i d e r and a po i n t e r to the next PNODE
unsigned char* conf_key; // c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y key
unsigned char* int_key; // i n t e g r i t y key
struct cache_info* cache; //a s t r u c t that ma in ta in s the cache i n f o rma t i on
struct hashmap* journal; //a s t r u c t that ma in ta in s the j o u r n a l
i n f o rma t i on
pthread_mutex_t metadata_cache_mutex; //mutex to l o ck the acce s s to the
cache hashmap
pthread_mutex_t journal_mutex; //mutex to l o ck the acce s s to
the j o u r n a l hashmap
pthread_cond_t journal_condition; // cond i t i o n to wakeup the j o u r n a l
th read
}; 
Listing 4.2: fs_state struct implementation
After having our fs_state struct filled with the necessary information we call fuse_main, passing
that structure so we can access it inside the FS operations. We also pass the structure mcfs_oper
to fuse_main. The mcfs_oper structure contains the functions of our FS as shown before in
listing 4.1, and the detailed implementation of those functions is described in section 4.9.
4.3 Availability module
In this module, we implement the necessary functions to add redundant information to our FS.
The objective of having redundant information in the system is to be able to recover from an
eventual loss of access to a CSP. So we need to be able to add redundant information to the
system and be able to recover files from the redundant information.
As discussed before in chapter 3 in order to generate redundancy we use parity checks, we split
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the files into n (being n the number of CSPs - 1) chunks and then generate an extra redundant
chunk. And to recover a file we get n − 1 chunks plus the redundant one and calculate the
missing chunk. For that, we have created three functions: one that splits a file into n chunks,
one that joins n chunks of a file, and one that calculates from n chunks an extra one calculating
the bit by bit parity between them.
The function used to calculate the parity between n file chunks is used both to generate the
redundant chunk or to recover a missing chunk as the logic is the same.
4.4 Confidentiality module
This module has the necessary functions to encrypt and decrypt the files stored in our FS with
the objective of keeping the confidentiality of the files even when a CSP is hostile or an attacker
manages to get access to the entire content of a CSP account.
As discussed in detail in Section 3.3 we use the algorithm AES-256 in the encryption/decryption
process. As implementing the whole algorithm is too much time expensive and often leads to
programming errors we use the OpenSSL EVP library that provides a high-level interface to
cryptographic functions.
We created a function to encrypt or decrypt a file depending on the value of a parameter
should_encrypt. It requires a key and a IV to be used in the process. The file to encrypt/decrypt
is passed as an argument, and the produced output is stored in a path also passed as an argument.
The cryptographic key used in decryption and encryption is defined in the initial configuration
and derived from a password. We defined a function that receives an alphanumeric password and
generates a cryptographic key with a size of 256 bits (as we are using AES-256) using OpenSSL
EVP module functions with that objective.
The IV value is critical because if we repeat it or make its generation predictable, an attacker
could do cryptanalysis and possibly reveal part of the original file or the cryptographic key. In
order to avoid that, we generate a random IV for each remote write, not only for each file. When
we update a file in the remote space we generate a new IV. For that, we created a function that
generates and returns a fixed size random IV.
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Apart from the above-described functions, there are additional ones. One is used to initialize the
crypto library and the other to do the cleanup by freeing the used resources.
4.5 Integrity module
This module is used to give the system the ability to detect integrity violation of the stored files
for that we use HMACs generated with the SHA algorithm as described in Section 3.4. We had
two options on this case:
File level Integrity Generate a HMAC for the files before the redundancy steps (split and generate
a redundant chunk), store it in the head of all chunks and then store them remotely. When
accessing a file, we would check if all chunks have the same HMAC and if the HMAC of
the reconstructed file (redundancy module again) matches the file. If any of the checks fail
then we can assume that the integrity of the file has been violated.
Chunk level Integrity Instead of just checking the integrity of the whole file we can check the
integrity of each chunk. For that we can generate a HMAC for each chunk instead of only
one HMAC for the original file. Then when accessing a file we can detect the integrity
violation of separated chunks and get the redundant chunk if necessary (if the integrity of a
single chunk is violated) to reconstruct the original file.
We have chosen to implement chunk level integrity, as it has the benefit of maintaining the access
to a file when a CSP account is compromised, and its stored files lose the integrity. For that we
have implemented two functions: one that generates a HMAC for a given file using a given key,
and one that calculates the HMAC of a given chunk and compares it with a given HMAC that is
used to verify the integrity of the stored files.
The key used in the HMAC generation process is generated using a user-provided password in the
initial configuration and is derived using the same function used in the confidentiality module
to generate the cryptographic key as they have the same size (for confidentiality we are using
AES-256, for integrity we are using SHA-256).
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4.6 Cloud Abstraction module
To interact with the CSP accounts which are our backing storage, we must create an abstraction
module because every CSP has its proprietary API and we want a CSP independent implementation.
For that, we defined some generic functions that make calls to different CSP APIs based on the
CSP we are accessing in the moment of the call.
In this work we only implemented the access to the DropBox API. This is enough to demonstrate
the validity of our solution if we use different accounts on that CSP.
We have defined the following functions:
auth_init Used to initialize the CSP client, performing the authentication process using the
initially provided authentication tokens;
read_dir Used to read the contents of a remote directory, returns an array with the metadata of
the files in a folder passed as argument;
get_metadata Used to get the metadata of a specific file passed as argument;
download_file Used to download a file passed as argument;
upload_file Used to upload a file passed as argument.
4.7 Cache module
The cache module is used in our system to improve the overall performance of the read and write
operations, as these operations are time-consuming due the network accesses needed to store
and get the files from the cloud. We have implemented a LRU cache substitution policy that
prioritizes the files utilized in the recent past, and discards the least recently used ones when
freeing space is necessary.
We have defined a struct (cache_info, shown in Listing 4.3) to represent the cache. It maintains
in memory all the necessary information about the cache, including the cache directory where we
store the files, and the used space. In this struct we store a hashmap containing metadata_entry
structs 4.3 where using the path of the files or folders in the FS as a key.
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When we list the contents of a folder (when we access it), we add a new metadata_entry to the
metadata_cache hashmap with the variable isDir set to true and with the variable contents
(an hashmap) filled with the files inside that folder. We maintain this in the cache in order to
improve the performance of the folder access. This way we do not need to request the the folder
contents from CSPs every time we access the folder. We also add the metadata of the files in the
folder to the cache adding a metadata_entry to metadata_cache. Note that when we do this,
we do not have the file in cache, we are only caching the metadata. Later when we store a file in
the local cache we add the path in the local storage to the cache_path variable of correspondent
metadata_entry.
The metadata of a folder is invalidated every time a file of that folder is remotely updated and
when we create or delete a file, and the metadata of a file is invalidated every time it is remotely
updated or deleted.
  
struct cache_info{
long cache_size; // t o t a l s i z e o f the cache
long used_space; //used cache space
char* cache_dir; // cach ing d i r e c t o r y
struct hashmap* metadata_cache; // cached f i l e s
};
struct metadata_entry {
double st_size; // f i l e s i z e
time_t atime; // acce s s t ime
time_t mtime; //modify t ime
bool isDir; // t rue f o r d i r e c t o r i e s , f a l s e f o r f i l e
bool local_cache; // t rue i f a v a i l a b l e i n l o c a l cache
bool remote_updated; // t rue i f updated i n the c l ouds
char* cache_path; //path f o r the cached f i l e ( i f a v a i l a b l e )
struct hashmap* contents; // the conten t s o f the f o l d e r ( on l y f o r f o l d e r s )
}; 
Listing 4.3: Cache representation structs function
In order to make the cache mechanism work, we have defined the following functions:
get_cached_attr Used to get the cached metadata of a file;
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add_cache_attr Used to cache the metadata of a file;
add_folder_contents Used to cache the contents of a folder;
remove_folder_contents Used to remove the cached contents of a folder;
add_file_cache Used to add a file to the cache, here we also remove any necessary files using
LRU replacement policy;
removef ilecache Used to remove a file from cache, deleting it from the local storage.
The LRU cache replacement policy is implemented in the function add_file_cache, when adding
a file to cache we remove a file if necessary according to the policy (described in detail in
Section 3.5). In order to determine which files need to be removed we use the atime variable
that represents the instant of the last access to the file.
4.8 Journaling module
In order to better recover from an eventual inconsistent state of the FS, we started the development
of a journaling module, to maintain a journal with pending operations (not yet done in the remote
storage). With this module we can also allow the users to operate the FS without Internet access,
enabling them to change files that are in the local cache, adding them to the journal and only
updating the data in the CSPs when connectivity is restored.
This was done by instead of doing the remote operations right away, add them to an hashmap,
defined in the fs_state struct (see Listing 4.2), and creating a worker thread that waits for a
signal (sent from the fuse operations) or a timeout to wake up (timeout because from fuse we
cannot detect connectivity changes) and check if new entries were added to the journal. If the
phone has Internet connection at the time, perform those operations and mark them as done. We
use a hashmap to represents the journal, where the key of the stored values is an incremental id,
and the value is a struct that contains information about an operation. We can use the contents
of the journal to roll back any changes that lead to an inconsistent state, or to perform the remote
operation. The struct used is described in Listing 4.4.
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  
typedef enum {
flush,
create,
unlink
} operation;
struct journal_entry {
operation op;
const char *path;
time_t timestamp
}; 
Listing 4.4: Journal struct implementation
In this module we have implemented the following functions:
init_worker_thread Used to create and initialize a worker thread that locks waiting for new
journal entries to be added in order to dispatch them;
add_journal_entry Used to add a new journal entry;
get_journal_entry Used to get the next journal entry (get the one that has the lower time
stamp);
remove_journal_entry Used to remove an entry from the journal;
Unfortunately, this module is not working. The worker thread is killed by the kernel in the Android
OS. The application was tested with this module turned on in Ubuntu Linux Distribution, and
everything works fine, but in the Android OS it does not. That means that in Android our system
only works with an Internet connection and the write operations are instantly synchronized with
the remote storage.
4.9 Fuse Operations
In this section, we look into detail how we use the previously described modules and how they
work together in order to meet the objectives. The implementation of this functions dictates how
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the FS will behave when it receives a request.
4.9.1 getattr
This function is used to get the metadata of the files that must be saved to a struct stbuf passed
in the parameter list. If the metadata is not cached, we get the metadata of the file from n− 1
CSP accounts and then add it to the cache. If we do not have at least n− 1 chunks of the file
(file present in n− 1 out of the n CSP accounts), we return an error as the file is not available at
the moment either because it was deleted or the CSP is down.
4.9.2 readdir
This function is used to list the contents of a folder, in order to simplify the implementation our
system do not allow the user to create additional folders, so it will always list the root contents or
return an error.
To perform this operation, if the contents of the folder is not in cache, we use the cloud abstraction
module function read_dir to get the root contents of all the CSP accounts, then we filter only
the ones that are present in at least n− 1 accounts, that are the available files.
Before returning the directory contents, we add them to the cache using the function add_folder_contents
from the cache module.
4.9.3 create
This is the function called to create a new file in the FS. We first verify if the file does not already
exist, otherwise we proceed to create it in the local cache, and save a file pointer in the struct
fuse_file_info. This file handler will be used later in the write and flush functions. We do
not immediately send the file to the clouds because when this function is called it is much likely
to be followed by writes, and then by a flush (the flush is always called, even if there are no reads)
and we update the remote space here.
We also create a meta_entry entry to save the metadata of the file in cache and also the location
of the cached file (created in the beginning of the operation) in local storage.
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4.9.4 write
This function writes data to an open file; we can directly access the file using the file handler
previously set up in open function. After the write, we must update the cache value for last access,
because of the LRU cache and mark the file as inconsistent in cache (not remotely updated) as
we are only updating it in the clouds when a flush is called to reduce the number of networking
operations. Note that in this function we should return exactly the number of bytes requested,
except on error.
4.9.5 open
This is one of the most important functions as is there that we get the files from the clouds if
they are not already in the local cache.
We start by checking if the file is already in the local cache, if it is we open the file and store its
file handler in the fuse_file_info fh field, the file handler is used to give access to the file in
the subsequent operations (e.g. write or flush).
If the file is not in the local cache we check if the file is not larger than the total size of our
cache. If it fits in cache we must check if it is available, where being available means that we
have at least n − 1 providers available containing the chunk. After confirming that the file is
available we proceed to download the necessary chunks using and checking their integrity. If
a provider is down or the integrity check of a chunk fails, the get_file function automatically
downloads the redundant chunk and calculates the missing one (using the availability module
function to calculate the parity between the other chunks). Finally this function merges the
chunks recreating the encrypted file. The get_file also removes the headers of the file parsing
the IV to the variable iv as we need it for the next step, that is the decryption of the file using
the encrypt_decrypt_file function of the confidentiality module.
After obtaining the original file, we add it to the cache using the function add_file_cache and
finally open it and add file handler the fuse_file_info fh field.
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4.9.6 read
The read function is only called after an open for the same file. That means that the file we want
to read from is already in the local cache, so we just make a read from that file. In the open
function we have set up a file handler (fi− > fh) to the target file, so we can use it to make the
read. After the read we must update the cache value for last access, because of the LRU cache.
This function does not need to make any changes in the remote files.
4.9.7 flush
This function requests all characters to be written to the controlled sequence, meaning that we
must make the writes to the file effective. This is where we update the remote storage.
We first make a flush to the local storage, then check if the file is not already updated in the
remote storage (a flush can be called with no changes to a file); if it is not we call a function to
do so (update_remote_file). Before returning we add the file the local cache if it is not already
there.
The update_remote_file function does the necessary operations to generate ensure file availabil-
ity, integrity and confidentiality. It starts by generating a random IV, and encrypting the file using
the IV and the key in fs_state− > key with the confidentiality function encrypt_decrypt_file.
Then we split the file in n− 1 chunks, where n is the number of CSP accounts , and calculate the
redundancy chunk using the functions of the availability module. After this we have a chunk per
CSP account, we just calculate the HMAC of each chunk, using the integrity module. Finally, we
add a header containing the HMAC and IV to the chunks and use the cloud abstraction module
to dispatch the files to each CSP.
4.9.8 unlink
This function is used to delete a file, that is a simple process, we iterate over the configured CSP
accounts and send a delete request for the respective chunk, then we remove the file from cache
(to free space if it is in local cache), and finally we invalidate the meta-data cache of the file as
we will not need it anymore.
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4.10 Compiling for Android
After the implementation of the fuse operations, we need to generate a binary file that runs on
the Android OS, for that we use the ndk-build script that launches the build scripts at the heart
of the NDK, in order to generate binaries compatible with the Android OS.
The ndk-build script requires two makefiles in order to build our sources: the Android.mk file,
which defines properties specific to individual modules, or libraries, and the Application.mk file,
which defines properties for all the modules that we use.
In the Application.mk file, we have only defined the target architecture (APP_ABI := armeabi-v7a),
we are compiling only for armeabi− v7a that is the most used architecture for smartphones.
In the Android.mk file we first compile the dependencies as static libs, and then include them in
the main module. This process was complex because the Android OS was missing a lot of core
libs that we needed, so we had to get the source code and generate mkfiles to build them as
static libs. We then build two executable files, the mcfs module that is our FS and fusermount
module that is used to unmount the file system.
After having these two files correctly written, to build the binary files we just need to be in the root
folder of the project and call the command ndk − build. As a result of this process we have two
binary files (fusermount and mcfs), now we can send them to a rooted Android phone and execute
mcfs with the necessary parameters (e.g. ./mcfsmount_dir 1024 crypt_pass hmac_pass) to
mount the FS and use fusermount − u mount_dir to unmount it.
4.11 Android Application
The Android application provides a visual interface that allows users to manage the system. The
main features are: generating the configuration file with the access tokens to the CSPs, mount
the FS and unmount it.
In the figure 4.2 we can see the main menu layout where we can set the passwords, the cache
size, the mount point and mount or unmount the FS.
The CSP account configuration menu, see figure 4.3, allows the users to add or remove CSP
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Figure 4.2: The main menu of our Android application, where we can set the passwords, mount and unmount the FS.
accounts to the configuration file.
Figure 4.3: The menu of our Android application where we can set manage the CSP accounts.
To add an account, we use the OAuth authorization framework (see Figure 4.4) that generates
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the access tokens to be later used in the FS implementation.
Figure 4.4: To add an CSP account to the system we use the OAuth authorization framework.
The configuration file is a json with an array (accs_ids) with the ids of the accounts and another
array containing the authentication tokens for each account (access_token, token_key and a
token_secret) 4.5.
  
{"accs_ids":[0,1,2],
"0":{
"access_token":"ilL8Daq4ojAAAAAAAAAAESU6g6ATWS1JK",
"token_key":"6aso0c2buznapjcc",
"token_secret":"3advtmu5ga6y6on"
},"1":{
"access_token":"ilL8Daq4ojAAAAAAAAAAESU6g6ATWS1JK",
"token_key":"f1a8cyggalblp3gk",
"token_secret":"0000000000000000"
},"2":{
"access_token":"ZQCtpXAYMC5n00yoy2npyZd3M8IuWCNAd",
"token_key":"rj3pwqyx5avbfbp0",
"token_secret":"ig19ae3gtppa9ib"
}
} 
Listing 4.5: Configuration file with the authentication information to the clouds
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After mounting the system, it will stay mounted until the user explicit hits the unmount button.
The folder chosen as the mount point will list the FS files and allow to access them like they were
local files also allowing to add new files to the system just by copying them into the folder.

Chapter 5
Testing and performance analysis
In this chapter, we test, validate, and evaluate the implemented system. First, we describe the
test setup, and then we explain how to use the application, presenting some preliminary results.
Then we make a performance evaluation and comparison to other solutions in order to validate
the viability of the solution. Finally we present the preliminary results of the implementation (the
FS and the Android application), showing the steps we need to configure the system and mount
the FS.
5.1 Application configuration and preliminary results
In this section we describe the test setup. All the tests here presented were made using a Samsung
Galaxy S3 running a rooted CyanogenMod Android OS on its 6.01 version (as we can see on
figure 5.1), connected the same wireless network with a contracted speed of 50Mbps.
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Figure 5.1: The setting menu of the phone used to do the tests
First, we install the Android application that also contains the binary file of the file system
generated with ndk-build. When we open the application the first thing we need to do is to
add at least three CSP accounts. For that, we have an account configuration menu, as shown
in Figure 5.2. To add an account we must press the AddAddcount button that initiates an
authorization request.
Figure 5.2: Android account configuration menu as open for the first time
In Figure 5.3, we show the menu used to login in the Dropbox CSP.
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Figure 5.3: Login into Dropbox CSP to add an account to the system
After logging in, we need to allow the access to the API of the CSP, in order to generate the
access tokens that we will need to communicate with the account. In figure 5.4 we can see the
page shown to authorize the API access for the Dropbox CSP.
Figure 5.4: After loggign in we need to allow the the API access
After allowing the API access, the account will be added to the system and the API access
tokens saved in a configuration file. In figure 5.5 we can see that now the account is listed in the
configurated accounts. In this menu we can also track the used space in each account.
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Figure 5.5: Accounts configuration menu with one account configurated
We need to add at least two more accounts in order to be able to use the system. The procedure
is the same as for the first account. After adding the necessary accounts, we can now configure
other parameters of the system. We need to set the total size of the local cache, the mount point
and the integrity and confidentiality passwords as we can see in figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: The configuration menu that allows to mount the system
After configuring the above-described parameters, the user can now press the MountFS button.
In figure 5.7 we can see the chosen mount point folder contents before we mount the system,
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using a regular file explorer.
Figure 5.7: Mount point folder contents before mount
After pressing the MountFS button, we copy the configuration file to the parent directory (the
mcfs binary is expecting it to be there) of the mount point and run the mcfs binary file with
the configured parameters. Moreover, we change the MountFS button to a button that allows
the user to unmount the system as we can see in figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: The configuration menu that allows to unmount the system
Finally, we can use the folder as a regular local folder, in order to get and store files in our FS. In
figure 5.9 we can see that now the folder chosen as mount point lists the files stored in the FS.
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Figure 5.9: Mount point folder contents after mount
The storage overhead for each file, assuming that we have configured three CSP accounts, is 33%
which means that if we have 6Gb of total space, 2Gb per account we can store up to 4Gb. This
overhead goes down as the number of CSP accounts goes up.
Using the system we noted that some applications do not work properly when operating with files
of our FS. This is due to the time that the operations take, that is higher than the operations in
the local storage. The cause of that issue is the low timeout values in the applications, as they
are not designed to work with network file systems. This happened mostly when the applications
were trying to open a file. The write operations behaved normally almost every time.
We made tests simulating the unavailability of one CSP, and the system successfully detected
and behaved correctly, getting the redundant chunk and calculating the missing one in order to
present the correct file to the user.
We also tested a case where the integrity of file was violated; the system detected and successfully
recovered from that by getting the redundant chunk and calculating and replacing the one that
had his integrity violated.
To test the cache system, we defined a cache size of 1Gb, and we stored files with various file
sizes summing up 2Gb. Then we opened some of them and the system correctly replaced in the
cache the ones that were not accessed for longer.
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5.2 Performance Analysis
In this section we present some performance test that we consider relevant to better evaluate the
behavior of our solution. We previously explained the storage overhead in Subsection 2.2; now we
want to understand the performance overhead.
The fact that we are using FUSE for the implementation implies some overhead that we can not
measure in code, because of that the time measurements were made on the command line using
the command line tool time, that measures the time that a command takes to run. Doing, for
example, time cp file1 root/, where root is the mount point of our system will measure the
time that our system takes to store a file.
We measured the time that our system takes to access and store a file, separating the time
that it takes to access a file in two categories: with and without the file in cache. For the
access operation we also measured the time when we have a CSP unavailable. In all the tests,
the measurements were repeated multiple times with different file sizes, being the average time
calculated by repeating the operations twenty times. The results are presented with plots where
the vertical blue bar represents the average duration of an operation, and the black vertical bar
represents the standard deviation.
The results of the first test correspond to the store operation, where we add a file to the FS
and measure the time that it takes. Analyzing the Figure 5.10 we can see that as expected the
average time to store a file increases with the file size. The growth of the average time is not
proportional to the file size: from the 1Mb file to the 10Mb file we have an increase of about 1.7
times; from the 10Mb file to the 100Mb file the growth is of about 5.3 times. From that, we
can conclude that as the file size increases the overhead of our operations (to ensure availability,
integrity, and confidentiality) in the file also grows, because if it were only for the network time
the growth would be more proportional to the file size.
Then we tested the average time to retrieve a file from the file system in the different scenarios
that we can face. The results are shown in Figure 5.11. We can see the huge difference between
having and not having the files in the cache. This is due to the fact that the files in cache are
stored in clear text (not encrypted); we do not need to get them from the network, and, moreover,
we do not need to make any operations on the file. We can also see that when we have one CSP
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Figure 5.10: The average time to store different sized files
down and the file is not cached we have an overhead. This is due to the fact that we need to
perform one extra step to recalculate the missing chunk.
Figure 5.11: The average time to get a 1Mb file stored in our system, in different situations
We repeated the previous test only changing the file size. The results can be seen in Figure 5.12
and the conclusions that we can draw from them are basically the same.
Again we repeated the previous test changing file size, and the results can be consulted in
Figure 5.13, the conclusions of this trial are basically the same as the two previous ones, but now
we can make some comparisons with the other two. We can note that the average time to get a
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Figure 5.12: The average time to get a 10Mb file stored in our system, in different situations
file not cached is not proportional the file size, being the increase from the 1Mb file to the 10Mb
file of about 2.6 times and from the 10Mb file to the 100Mb file of about 5.4 times. Similarly to
the store operations, this is due to the overhead of the operations over the file. As the file size
grows, so does the time that it takes to encrypt it, calculate the HMAC and the other operations
described in chapter 3. The average time that takes to get a cached file is almost proportional to
the file size. This is because the only performed operation is a system open, and its duration
increases proportionally to the file size.
Figure 5.13: The average time to get a 100Mb file stored in our system, in different situations
FCUP 74
Testing and performance analysis
We also compared our system with a conventional single cloud application (Android Dropbox
application). As we can see in Figure 5.14, the average time it takes to store a file with our
system is about 2.6 times higher compared to Dropbox Android application. The average time to
get a previously stored file in our system is about 2.1 times higher than with Dropbox Android
application, as we can see in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.14: The average time to store a 10Mb file with our system and Dropbox Android application
Figure 5.15: The average time to get a 10Mb file with our system and Dropbox Android application
The less favorable performance of the get and store operations in our system are due to the
fact that it needs to perform more computations for the file operations (to add availability,
integrity, and confidentiality) and it needs to get file chunks from different sources, while Dropbox
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application gets the file from one source and do a lot less computation over the file.
The measurements of the times of the Dropbox application get and store operations were made
using the Android App, measuring the time from the click on the button (send file/download file)
to the end of the task.
The collected data helped us understand the impact of the cache module in the system performance,
providing a great performance gain after the first access to a certain file. In general the performance
(access times) is very acceptable, taking into account that that the system provides confidentiality,
integrity and improved availability of the files.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
We successfully implemented an Android FS that has backing storage public CSPs and is able to
detect and recover from integrity violation, recover from one CSP failure by adding redundancy
using coding techniques, and ensure file confidentiality using cryptographic techniques.
The availability of the files is improved using a coding technique that generates redundant
information. The integrity and confidentiality of the stored files is achieved using cryptographic
techniques.
Users configure the file system adding CSP accounts and setting passwords to be utilized in the
cryptographic operations. Then they can mount the FS in a local folder, and use it as it was local
storage. The fact that the files are remotely stored is completely transparent to the user, except
the performance because of the network nature of the operations.
The cipher used to achieve confidentiality of the files is AES-256, that is the industry standard. It
is considered secure for the coming years as there is no evidence of successful attacks to it. Each
CSP only contains a chunk of the encrypted file. An attacker that manages to get access to a
CSP account can only see encrypted chunks of the original files, thus being unable to retrieve any
information about the original content.
To give the system the ability to detect integrity violations and recover from them we used
HMAC, using the SHA 2 algorithm with a 256 key size (SHA/256). Therefore, we can detect if a
previously stored chunk of a file has been changed since it was stored.
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The availability of the stored files is improved using a coding technique that generates a redundant
chunk stored in an extra CSP, giving the system the ability to tolerate the failure of one CSP.
The performance degradation and storage overhead, when compared to other solutions, is the
price we have to pay for the security and data availability of our solution. The overhead does
not compromise any of the user direct operations and it is acceptable taking into account the
security and availability provided by the system. However, some applications do not tolerate the
time overhead of the storage operations, due to its low timeout values.
6.1 Future Work
Although the objectives of this work are met there are some aspects that can be improved. For
future work we consider the following improvements:
Cache Replacement Policy In this work we only implemented one cache replacement policy
(LRU). The implementation and testing other policies can reveal some interesting facts
about the access times. The system can even let the user choose what cache replacement
policy to use;
Journaling Module The journaling module is implemented but not working in the Android OS.
Due to the lack of time we could not find the origin of this error. This issue needs to be
addressed in the future work. Also, we can improve the journaling module to better recover
from eventual inconsistency states and;
Availability For most of the cases, the implemented method to improve the availability of stored
files is sufficient. However, we can improve this even further allowing the system to resist
to the simultaneous unavailability of more than one CSP;
Cloud Access Module In this module, due the lack of time and tools, we only implemented
the access to the DropBox CSP. It is important to implement the access to other CSPs in
order to get the system fully functional;
Recover File System Create a module to allow the users to replace a configured CSP account
and automatically migrate the data to the new account (generate the correspondent file
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chunks from the other CSP accounts). This feature is necessary to replace a CSP account
of CSP that goes off business and maintain the system fully functional.
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